Saturday, November 2, 2019

TheList 5133

The List 5133 TGB

To All,

Don't forget to reset your clocks tonight

There are a couple of articles for your reading pleasure in case your football teams are not doing well.



Reset your rocks tonight

Returning to standard time

Resetting the clock at Stonehenge for the end of daylight savings time

This is about as worthwhile as what we do


Thanks to Carl

See the attachment


"Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night ... United State Postal Service."


Thanks to Dan

Lehman on Beirut Bombing

Question and Answer Session following luncheon remarks by 9/11 Commission Member and former SECNAV John Lehman.

Question: I'm Dan Moore. I'm from Northwestern Naval ROTC. My question deals with operational command and control. In an interview in Proceedings you mentioned that military command and control as highlighted by the Long Commission, the orders given by President Reagan, that the Marines should be able to protect themselves on the ground in Beirut got completely reversed by the time it got down to Beirut and we lost some pretty good folks. What insights can you share with about operational civilian command and control in the environment we're in or where we're headed?

Answer: Well, that is a very good question because the lack of accountability is a hallmark of bureaucracy and the bureaucratic process and to look at the problem we face in one way we have created an environment which is not conducive to strong individuals providing the leadership that is essential to accountability and authority and in those situations where you have an environment, a peace time environment dominated by hotlines, whistleblowers, and the kinds of criminal investigations that are around every corner, what happens is bureaucracy rules.

Time after time when we investigated why, for instance, CIA didn't respond to what President Clinton wanted to do. And the record is very clear, the President Clinton wanted to kill Osama bin Laden. But by the time it got out into the bureaucracy, and the Joint Staff was even worse than CIA, unless they had a lawyer by their side and a written brief saying "you can do this," then nobody would do anything because nobody was going to cross any line of internal procedure or regulation or executive order or whatever.

The most shocking thing to me, really, having been out of the government and living out of Washington all those years after 1987 until I came back to this was the huge increase in the influence of lawyers at every level…. lawyers and legalism. I don't mean this facetiously, we all love to bash the lawyers but the phenomenon of the gradual like hydrilla in the Potomac. The growth of legalism in the policy process was a real shock to me and what that is a symptom of is this larger issue of no accountability.

If you follow bureaucratic procedure and don't knock the railroad and don't disagree with your seniors and don't take controversial positions then you aren't going to get a dime dropped on you with the 800 number. And you are, you will be seen as a "team player" when the promotion boards meet and so forth. It's a very…. It's a phenomenon that affects every peace-time large organization including civilian organizations and corporations. Corporations that get monopolies like so many of our defense contractors have today get the same way. It's just a natural phenomenon. Don't knock the house view, you know. If the house view for this particular missile is this, don't, don't say you have a better way because, you know, next time the next project comes up and they need to promote somebody, it ain't gonna be you.

So that is a larger phenomenon that afflicts why we have such lousy intelligence today. And you've put your finger on it, so I assume you have come up with a solution

Source: Audio CD transcript from the Marine Corps Association and U.S. Naval Institute "FORUM 2004" 7 September 2004 Arlington, VA.


Thanks to Rob

Subject: The WWII Japanese atomic bomb project

I'm the author of, among others, four books about fighter pilots - Scream of Eagles, Wings of Fury, Black Aces High and First Blue. Prior to those, however, I wrote a book titled Japan's Secret War. It was about Japan trying to make an atomic bomb during World War II, which they did, and quite vigorously – a fact virtually unknown when the book was first published by Morrow in 1985. A new, greatly expanded and updated edition of Secret War is to be published this December and I think your readers might be interested.

Japan did try to make an atomic bomb during WWII. Their effort culminated in Occupied Korea. In fact, evidence exists that they test fired a nuclear device in the sea off Korea where they had their main plants. But too late. The war ended. They had hoped to ready a weapon for use against the coming Allied invasion. But the Russians invaded, captured their plants,and as you probably know, became the next power, after the U.S., to officially produce an atomic bomb. They did so with the help of what they got in Korea. And that's not me talking. It's Department of Defense researchers who used earlier editions of my book to pinpoint little-known North Korean targets. These security-cleared researchers' stories are part of the new book.

In addition, when done looting, the Russians turned the Japanese plants over to fledgling North Korea which is the little-known, real beginning of North Korea's nuclear program – the same they are threatening us and Japan with today. It's ironic that Japan's program has come back to bite them. Karma?

Back in 1985, the first edition of my book, met with controversy. Japan was solely a victim of the bomb, said critics, and America was vicious decision to use it. The fact that I'd gone to Japan, interviewed scientists and soldiers involved, dug up formerly top-secret documents in U.S. and Japanese archives didn't matter. The story was understandably buried by Japan. Not revealing it had its advantages. The U.S., needing an ally against Russia, was happy to comply. So, to bolster what I'd done, I went back to the archives and dug up more proof. A second edition was published by Marlowe in 1995. Critics said, OK, we concede there was a project but it was rudimentary and ended in April 1945 with the bombings of Tokyo where the fledgling project was housed.

Not true. In fact, Japan proper had housed only pilot projects – like our early ones. It's scientists, backed by the military, had been considering a bomb since the late 1930s. By 1945, Japan's "Manhattan Project," with secret projects throughout Asia, was centered in northern Korea where the Japanese had a huge industrial complex stretching up the northern coast. The complex's power came from the Chosen and Fusan reservoirs high in the interior mountains. Uranium and other fissionable fuels to trigger the bomb were mined in Korea and throughout Asia. Most important, these plants, headquartered at Konan (today Hungnam), were unknown and untouched by Allied bombings. The work could proceed with little obstruction, hopefully culminating with the destruction of the U.S. invasion fleet.

It didn't happen. But the coverup did. One thing I wish I'd done better in the earlier editions was footnote every fact. I'd simply listed sources in the back. For the new edition, I did that – a tremendous job since I'd moved since writing the earlier editions and lost many files. I also rewrote much of the story, which is dramatic, adding perhaps 100 new pages of information that has surfaced since the last edition in 1995. The result is Japan's Secret War, 3rd edition. It's told through the lives of the soldiers and scientists who lived it, many I personally interviewed. It's one of the last untold stories of World War II. Permuted Press is publishing it. They are a division of Simon & Schuster.

Not only is this important history. Much of nuclear history is still secret. It's also pertinent to national security. As I said, certain DOD researchers believe that we still do not know all the places North Korea keeps nukes. Their nuclear system is a vast honeycomb of underground silos. That dearth could be disastrous. Past administrations – particularly Carter's, Clinton's, and Obama's – were too quick to make deals with North Korea and have left this history unknown. To be sure of every silo, researchers must start at the beginning, which was when the Soviets gave over the Japanese plants. Only then can they be sure of these hideouts. It's not been done – yet.

One more thing. The Japanese were, as I've explained, understandably resistant to this story. Few have heard of it. But the new edition broke that down. Japan's Bensei published it in August. The Japanese general who did the translation, Yoshiaki Yano, wrote me that they did not believe the story until reading the new edition.

Here are pertinent URLs:


Japanese edition (Bensai JP)



Confessions Of A Submarine Hunting S-3 Viking Crewman DuringThe Twilight Of The Cold War


Yes, we called Her, "Boat". True story. Repeated numerous times every cruise. Airbosses hate rotors. Doing plane guard we were constantly hung out during air ops, denied returns to the deck to refuel. Bingo light flashing like crazy and only a few minutes of JP left. I'd say to my Crew Chief, "Chief, unless you want to go swimming, we needed to get gas 10 minutes ago!" He knew my requests were being totally ignored. Chiefs hate to go swimming. Chiefs have super powers unavailable to ordinary sailors, officers and Naval Aviators. Chief would always reply after a few moments, "Sir, take the bus to the Boat immediately!" Back to the Boat we went. As I maneuvered over the deck into the tight space available to hot fuel, we'd always hear a pissed off Airboss on the horn saying, "Who the hell let Angel 4 aboard?" And, Chiefs rule.


On November 2, 2019 at 4:06 PM Walt Brand <> wrote:

Mud: I totally agree with the good Captain. Our military leadership started being short sighted on the day the USSR broke apart. Anti-sub bases around the world were closed, Iceland, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Philippines, etc., etc.. I saw this coming from day one. PS: The last Navy aircraft I saw crash and burn was an S-3 at NAS Jacksonville. It was on approach in a severe T-storm and a down draft pushed it into the ground a few hundred feet west of the base fence-line. TF

From: Mud
Sent: Saturday, November 2, 2019 1:53 PM

Subject: Re: Confessions Of A Submarine Hunting S-3 Viking Crewman DuringThe Twilight Of The Cold War A good friend, a retired Navy captain, wrote this. I found it to be of interest and thought you might as well.

We just got back from our 10 day trip out west and I am catching up on email. I noticed this one sent in our absence about the S-3 Viking, the last aircraft I flew off the carrier. I commanded an S-3 squadron of ten S-3s aboard USS Saratoga and subsequently commanded the S-3 Wing of six squadrons at NAS Cecil Field at Jacksonville FL. back in 1980-81.

The S-3 was great aircraft and a quantum improvement over the S-2 series that had recip engines but probably out dated today. The main problem some 20 years ago, the Soviet submarine threat seemed to fade away and China was no submarine threat in those days. The Navy took all the ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) gear out of the S-3s and virtually made them tankers for the fighter/attack aircraft aboard the carrier and do surface surveillance. In my opinion that was a gigantic mistake as Russia has made a come back and China today indeed poses a significant submarine threat to carriers and all surface ships with their diesel subs which are extremely difficult to track -- they are extremely quiet submerged. We seem to never learn that Submarine and Anti-Submarine Warfare has been a significant part of two world wars and will be no doubt a significant part of any future war. The sinking of a modern day aircraft carrier represents an extremely large expenditure not to mention the loss of personnel and aircraft -- some $9 Billion to build.

Another big problem is that we decommissioned all the S-3s about 10 years ago and they are sitting in the desert with many useful flight hours remaining on those air frames. There is virtually no ASW capability aboard the US Carrier today except sonar dipping helos. Not bad for in close to the carrier but helos can't go out to the 250 mile radius and operate where you hunt for submarines.

It seems we never learn!

That was a good article but a bit looong. It had some good information about ASW and the S-3 but it was through the eyes of an Enlisted Air Crewman, a junior one at that it seems. A lot of "Golly-Gee" personal BS. I think it would have been completely different if written by a Navy Pilot or Naval Flight Officer. The carrier is not a "boat" but that is what most enlisted people and a lot of Navy Pilots and Flight Officers call it. It is anything but a boat. Some 95,000 tons with 5,000 personnel including the Air Wing and about 90 aircraft.

Please don't get me wrong, the enlisted people in the Navy are a very important part that makes the Navy tick and go but many of them have a different understanding of the Navy compared to officers and pilots. Junior Enlisted tend to have a relative juvenile approach to the Navy and see things from the bottom up.

My two cents worth and thanks for the article.


No comments:

Post a Comment

Featured Post

THE MYSTERIOUS PHONE CALL Jack Blanchard's Column February 13, 2021

        Thousands of readers around the world ...