Wednesday, June 5, 2019

TheList 5012

The List 5012 TGB



I hope that your week has started well.

Regards,
skip
Today in Naval History
June 4
1934 USS Ranger (CV 4), the first U.S. Navy ship designed from the keel up as a carrier, is commissioned at Norfolk, Va. During World War II, she participates in Operation Torch and Operation Leader.
1942 The Battle of Midway begins. During that morning, after sending planes to attack the U.S. base at Midway, the Japanese carriers Akagi, Kaga and Soryu are fatally damaged by dive bombers from USS Enterprise (CV 6) and USS Yorktown (CV 5). Later in the day, USS Yorktown is abandoned after bomb and torpedo hits by planes from Hiryu. The latter is, in turn, knocked out by U.S. carrier planes. Compelled by their losses to abandon their plans to capture Midway, the Japanese retire westward. The battle is a decisive win for the U.S, bringing an end to Japanese naval superiority in the Pacific.
1943 TBF aircraft from USS Bogue (CVE 9) attack German submarine U 603 in the Atlantic. Though U 603 is not sunk, its forced to submerge, sparing a nearby LCI convoy from attack. USS Bronstein (DE 189) finally sinks U 603 in the North Atlantic on March 1, 1944.
1942 As the Battle of Midway continues, US dive-bomber pilots spot the whole Japanese carrier strike force below. The Japanese combat air patrol that should have been above the carriers to protect them were at sea level destroying the American torpedo-bombers. The SBD Dauntless dive bombers attack from 15,000 feet just at the moment when the decks of the carriers Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu are loaded with planes, fuel and ordnance. They were quickly enveloped in flames and destroyed.
1944 The hunter-killer group comprised of five destroyer escorts and USS Guadalcanal (CVE 60) captures German submarine, (U 505). This marks the first time a U.S. Navy vessel captures an enemy vessel since the early 19th century. The feat earns Lt. Albert L. David, who led the team to board the sub, the Medal of Honor.
1944 USS Flier (SS 250) sinks Japanese troopship Hakusan Maru about 375 miles southwest of Chichi Jima, Bonin Islands. Also on this date USS Golet (SS 361) sinks Japanese guardboat No.10 Shinko Maru east of Japan.
2011 USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110) is commissioned at the Port of Mobile, Ala. The destroyer, the 60th in her Arleigh Burke-class, departs soon after to her homeport at Naval Station San Diego.
 
Thanks to CHINFO
Executive Summary:
•             Seapower Magazine reports that Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command has changed its name to Naval Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWARSYSCOM) to reflect its commitment to information warfare. "We have been on a steady drumbeat since the issuance of the Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority to further normalize information warfare into the way we do operations and warfighting in the Navy," said CNO Adm. John Richardson of the change.
•             USNI News reports that the House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee included in its Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act mark language that would prohibit the Navy form accepting delivery of John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) unless the carrier can deploy with F-35C Lightning II John Strike Fighters.
•             ABC News reported on USS Abraham Lincoln amid heightened tensions between the U.S. and Iran. "I'm just here to do what has been asked of me and that is to deter Iranian aggression, ensure free flow of commerce through the important strait and narrow waterways, and then to ensure that our forces are protected and defended if required," said Adm. John Wade.
Today in History June 4
1615

The fortress at Osaka, Japan, falls to Shogun Leyasu after a six-month siege.
1647

Parliamentary forces capture King Charles I and hold him prisoner.
1717

The Freemasons are founded in London.
1792

Captain George Vancouver claims Puget Sound for Britain.
1794

British troops capture Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
1805

Tripoli is forced to conclude peace with the United States after a conflict over tribute.
1859

The French army, under Napoleon III, takes Magenta from the Austrian army.
1864

Confederates under General Joseph Johnston retreat to the mountains in Georgia.
1911

Gold is discovered in Alaska's Indian Creek.
1918

French and American troops halt Germany's offensive at Chateau-Thierry, France.
1919

The U.S. Senate passes the Women's Suffrage bill.
1940

The British complete the evacuation of 300,000 troops at Dunkirk.
1943

In Argentina, Juan Peron takes part in the military coup that overthrows Ramon S. Castillo.
1944

The U-505 becomes the first enemy submarine captured by the U.S. Navy.
1944

Allied troops liberate Rome.
1946

Juan Peron is installed as Argentina's president.
1953

North Korea accepts the United Nations proposals in all major respects.
1960

The Taiwan island of Quemoy is hit by 500 artillery shells fired from the coast of Communist China.
1972

Black activist Angela Davis is found not guilty of murder, kidnapping, and criminal conspiracy.
 
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"ISR" in the Battle of Midway
S.J. Cox
17 May 17
"To Commander Joe Rochefort must forever go the acclaim of having made more difference at a more important time than any officer in history."  At least, that's what Captain Edward L. "Ned" Beach, Jr. (skipper of USS Triton's (SSNR-586) around-the-world submerged voyage and author of "Run Silent, Run Deep" and other submarine classics) said.  There is no question that CDR Rochefort, commander of Station Hypo at Pearl Harbor, had profound effect on the outcome of the battle.  He also had a lot of help, including from Japanese mistakes.
    Station Hypo was a short-hand term used for the U.S. Navy's code-breaking and signals intelligence operation, more formally known as the Combat Intelligence Unit embedded within the naval communications station in the basement of the 14th Naval District Headquarters (commanded by RADM Claude Bloch,) with CDR Rochefort as officer-in-charge of communications.  The 14th Naval District reported to the CNO, and Rochefort reported to OP-20G at Navy Headquarters in Washington DC.  Officially, any intelligence developed by Hypo was to be sent to Washington D.C. (Station Negat) for analysis and dissemination.  However, Rochefort had a long established relationship and friendship with the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, LCDR Edwin Layton, when both underwent Japanese language training in Japan earlier in their careers.   Rochefort routinely passed intelligence directly to Layton (to the consternation of Washington) who was only one of two officers accorded immediate and direct access to Admiral Nimitz at any hour.
    Nimitz was a firm believer in the principle, first recorded by Sun Tzu and implemented by Julius Ceasar, that the commander should receive his intelligence direct from his intelligence sources, unfiltered by anyone else.  Despite the fact that both Layton and Rochefort had been in the same jobs for the Pearl Harbor debacle, Nimitz recognized Layton's unique talents and retained him, and made no effort to remove Rochefort (who technically didn't work for Nimitz anyway.)  Nimitz told Layton that his job was to think like Admiral Yamamoto and provide estimates of what he thought the Japanese intended to do.  Neither Layton nor Rochefort were intelligence officers (or codebreakers;) there was no such thing.  Both were line officers who had had a few intelligence assignments in between the line assignments necessary for promotion; intelligence work was generally considered non-career enhancing (junior officers assigned to an intelligence billet on a battleship were known to be made the ship's laundry officer) but was considered OK for a non-USNA officer like Rochefort.  Layton was a rare USNA line officer with exceptional talent, who had also willingly served in multiple intelligence assignments, and who, like Rochefort, spoke fluent Japanese.
     The U.S. Navy code-breaking effort dated back almost to WWI, and had progressed in fits and starts in the 1920's and 1930's, and had benefited greatly from Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) "black-bag jobs" such as breaking and entering the Japanese consulate to copy codebooks, etc. (which would be illegal now, and technically was illegal even then.)  By the time of Pearl Harbor, U.S. Navy and U.S. Army cryptologists (they took turns on alternate days) were breaking and reading the Japanese diplomatic code (called "Purple" and the program "Magic") faster than the Japanese embassy in Washington.  Initial inroads were being made on breaking the Japanese Navy general operating code, known at the time as the "5 num" code, and retroactively as the JN-25 series (JN-25B at the time leading up to Pearl Harbor and Midway – changed to JN-25C a week before Midway.)  Rochefort was not the "code-breaker."  He was in charge of code-breakers; he had some previous tours in signals intelligence and code-breaking, and was well-suited for the assignment.  The senior code-breaker in Station Hypo was actually LCDR Carter Ham.  At the time of Pearl Harbor, Hypo had been assigned to beat their heads against the wall trying to break the Japanese Flag Officers Code (which was never broken) while Station Negat in D.C. and Station Cast at Cavite, Philippines worked on JN-25B.
    After Pearl Harbor, Hypo was allowed to work on JN-25B, and began to have success.  Each raid by U.S. carriers on outlying Japanese garrison islands in early 1942 resulted in a flurry of Japanese communications (and communications security violations) tied to a specific, known event, which greatly aided the code-breaking effort, which in conjunction with "traffic analysis" (analysis of message externals; to, from, precedence, length, etc.) led to increasingly accurate estimates of Japanese force disposition and intent.  However, even at best, the U.S. was only intercepting about 60% of Japanese naval communications, analyzing about 40%, and actually breaking and reading only about 10-15%, frequently only fragments of message internals (the "text".)  Even when broken, the message was still in esoteric highly-technical jargon-laden "navalese" Japanese, i.e., very difficult to translate by even the best linguists (coupled with the fact that very many geographic locations in the Pacific had multiple different names.)  So, it was not as if ADM Nimitz before Midway had his own copy of the Japanese Operations Order.  All he had was fragments, amplified by traffic analysis, other signals intelligence (intercepted clear voice) and other basic intelligence analysis techniques, and the experience and intuition of Layton.
    Nevertheless, throughout the spring of 1942, Nimitz gained increasing confidence in the intelligence being provided by Layton and Rochefort.  It was intelligence that led him to commit the USS Yorktown (CV-5) and USS Lexington (CV-3) to counter the Japanese invasion attempt on Port Moresby, New Guinea, that resulted in the Battle of the Coral Sea on 7-8 May.  On 12 May, Rochefort's code-breakers got the first indications that the Japanese were planning a major operation in the Central Pacific, and Rochefort informed Layton that it was "really hot."  As more message traffic was intercepted, both Rocheforte and Layton became convinced that Midway Island was the target, and they convinced Nimitz as well.  Washington was not convinced, even though OP-20G/Negat and War Plans were analyzing the same intelligence.
    Before Pearl Harbor and well into the spring of 1942, the Intelligence situation in Washington D.C. was dysfunctional (contributing significantly to the disaster at Pearl Harbor.)  Four different Directors of Naval Intelligence in a little over a year (none with intelligence background; most who didn't want the job) didn't help, nor did the constant reorganizations.  The bitter long-running bureaucratic (and resource) battle between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence over who should own "Communications Intelligence" (and code-breaking) had severe detrimental effect, and at the time Naval Communications was in the driver's seat.  After Pearl Harbor, the "father of U.S. Navy code-breaking," CDR Laurance Safford was removed and replaced by a line officer as OP-20G who had no experience in the subject.  ONI was also involved in a bitter losing battle with the War Plans Division, under RADM Richmond Kelly Turner, in which ONI was barred from providing "assessments" of intelligence, since Kelly convinced CNO's Stark and King that assessment was a War Plans operational function and ONI was just supposed to provide the raw intelligence.  Just prior to Pearl Harbor, Kelly officially assessed that the Japanese would not attack the United States but would attack Russia instead.  ONI held a different view.  Also, Layton and Rochefort had experienced the chaotic period after Pearl Harbor in which a flood of bogus rumors ("RUMINT") had paralyzed operational decision-makers.  Station Negat on the other hand, "under new management" still chased after and reported numerous false and contradictory leads, providing "worst case" analysis to King.
    Contrary to many books and movies, the famous "AF" gambit run by Rochefort was an attempt to get Washington to believe that "AF" stood for Midway, not to convince Nimitz.  With an idea provided by Jasper Holmes, one of his staff, Rochefort had a message sent via secure underwater cable to Midway for Midway to broadcast a phony radio message in the clear saying that Midway's fresh water-making capability was broken.  The Japanese intercepted the message and retransmitted the information, which was intercepted and broken by Hypo, confirming that AF stood for Midway.  Still, many in Washington were unconvinced under the "this is too-good-to-be-true" principle.  There were also a lot of good reasons why invading Midway Island seemed to make no sense.  In fact the Japanese Naval General Staff had made the same arguments in a losing battle against ADM Yamamoto's plan.  There was also considerable argument about the wisdom of basing a plan around Japanese intent rather than Japanese worst-case capability, and that it all might be an elaborate Japanese deception.  Eventually CNO King came around after ordering an assessment be provided to him direct from Rochefort.
    On 17 May, convinced that Midway was the main Japanese objective, Nimitz sent an eyes-only (and "no CNO") message to VADM Halsey, embarked on USS Enterprise (CV-6) directing him to deliberately expose Enterprise and TF-17 to Japanese reconnaissance aircraft in the vicinity of the Gilbert Islands, which Halsey dutifully did.  This accomplished several objectives.  By "blowing" Halsey's operation, Nimitz had a pretext to recall Enterprise and Hornet to Pearl Harbor (the damaged Yorktown was already en route Pearl Harbor for repair after Coral Sea) so that he could concentrate his forces at Midway, and get King off his back about keeping a carrier in the South Pacific to counter a possible Japanese thrust against the Fiji/Somoa area, which deeply concerned King.  It also fooled the Japanese into thinking at least one of the U.S. carriers was in the South Pacific, which would enable the Midway operation to defeat the U.S. carriers piecemeal.
    On 18 May, Nimitz directed Layton to provide his best estimate of where and when the Japanese carriers would first be detected.  Layton provided the estimate on 27 May (see Overview) and the same day Nimitz issued OPLAN 29-42, directing Enterprise and Hornet to proceed to the vicinity of Midway, and Yorktown to follow suit as soon as temporary repairs were complete at Pearl.  Nimitz also directed that TF-1, the battleships, several of which had been repaired after Pearl Harbor, to remain on the West Coast, to the dismay of TF1 Commander VADM Pye (and to some degree CNO King) because they were too slow, too vulnerable, and used up too much fuel.
    Nimitz also directed that Midway Island's defenses be significantly increased, including additional reconnaissance aircraft.  By early June, 1942, the 127 aircraft based on Midway Island included 31 PBY Catalina flying boats, a few rigged to carry a torpedo.  Seventeen USAAF B-17 bombers also provided additional reconnaissance capability.  The PBY's began to fly missions out to 700 miles from Midway, and on 3 Jun sighted the Japanese minesweeper group coming from Guam and also the Japanese invasion/occupation force, which was also sighted and reported by a U.S. submarine.  B-17's also bombed the invasion force with no hits (although many were claimed.)  Thick fog to the northwest of Midway, covered (and delayed) the Japanese carrier force.
   Before dawn on 4 Jun, 15 B-17's launched to attack the invasion force again, while 22 PBY's commenced reconnaissance flights, mostly to the northwest.  The Yorktown, at "Point Luck" northeast of Midway also launched 10 SBD Dauntless dive-bombers on a relatively short 100 nm search pattern to assure RADM Fletcher that no Japanese carriers were in close proximity.
    At 0530, a PBY flown by LT Howard P. Ady sighted Japanese ships northwest of Midway and issued a sighting report at 0534.  At 0545 another PBY, flown by LT William Chase sighted the inbound Japanese air strike and reported "many aircraft heading Midway." Several minutes later, at 0552, Chase sighted two of the Japanese carriers.  Midway radar detected the incoming strike at 0553.  Word of the Japanese carriers reached Fletcher, Spruance and Nimitz shortly after 0600 (almost right on Layton's estimate.)
    The Japanese Navy had a relatively robust intelligence capability, in particular a very effective shipboard radio intelligence capability that could intercept and translate U.S. clear voice communications in near-real-time providing useful tactical information to Japanese commanders even in the heat of battle.  The Japanese were also relatively proficient at traffic analysis.  Japanese radio intelligence picked up and reported the greatly increased volume of high-precedence U.S. messages in the days before Midway, but the significance was lost on senior Japanese commanders, who remained fixated on the plan and the belief that it could not have been compromised.   Japan's extremely long-range reconnaissance seaplanes were also very capable, although also very vulnerable to U.S. fighters. The Japanese, however, were not able to break U.S. Navy codes (but not for want of trying,) which left them at a significant disadvantage.  Also, the small but effective Japanese human intelligence network on Oahu was rolled up very quickly after Pearl Harbor, and Japanese-Americans (Nisei) in Hawaii (or the mainland U.S.) never engaged in espionage as feared.  (In fact the official ONI assessment was that the Nisei were not a threat and recommended against internment, but was overruled by the Army and President Roosevelt.)
    Without a human intelligence network in Hawaii, the Japanese plan depended on reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor by flying-boat, and a line of submarines between Hawaii and Midway.  Both operations failed miserably.  Operation K was to be a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor by two Kawanishi H8K Type 2 "Emily" long-range flying-boats from the Marshall islands, which would refuel from submarines at French Frigate Shoals (midway between Oahu and Midway Island) specifically to determine whereabouts of the U.S. carriers.  The Japanese had done this before.  On the night of 3-4 March two Kawanishi flying-boats conducted a reconnaissance/bombing mission over Pearl Harbor.  Station Hypo provided advance warning of the operation, but night and overcast prevented intercept, but also precluded reconnaissance or accurate bombing by the Japanese.  One of the flying-boats dropped its bombs through the overcast onto the foothills near the Punchbowl.  No one knows where the other plane's bombs went.  (This is also the known as the "second air raid on Pearl Harbor.")  The Japanese tried another similar operation with one flying-boat on 9-10 March, but this was also compromised, and the flying-boat was shot down by a USMC fighter from Midway Island.  The Japanese did not catch on that this might be a bad idea.
    When Operation K was implemented, the Japanese submarine sent to conduct reconnaissance of French Frigate Shoals discovered a U.S. seaplane tender and destroyer camped out.  The U.S. ships were sent there deliberately by Nimitz to keep the Japanese from doing exactly what they were trying to do.  The two refueling submarines I-121 and I-123 lingered for a couple days hoping the U.S. ships would go away, but on 31 May, Operation K was cancelled, depriving the Japanese of critical intelligence on the U.S. carriers.  The implication that the U.S. might be forewarned was also ignored by senior Japanese commanders.
    The Japanese submarine reconnaissance line was an even bigger failure.  The plan called for seven submarines to be stationed along a line north of the Hawaiian Islands and seven more south of the Hawaiian islands, midway between Midway and Oahu, to detect and report the transit of U.S. carriers.  However, most of the submarines committed were among the oldest and least reliable in the Japanese Navy, although this was known, and ignored by senior Japanese commanders.  What Yamamoto and Nagumo did not know was that the entire submarine force had been held back by mechanical difficulties of several of them, and none of the submarines reached station when they were supposed to.  The politically-connected and royally-related RADM Marquis Teruhisa Komatsu, Commander of 6th Fleet (submarines) decided not to tell anyone about the late departure.  Actually it wouldn't have made any difference.  Even if the submarines had arrived on schedule, all three U.S. carriers had already gone past.
     The only Japanese submarine to distinguish itself in a reconnaissance role, was I-168 (which also later sank the Yorktown.)  I-168 observed Midway Island for several days before the battle, accurately reporting that Midway's defenses had been greatly beefed up, that the island was on high alert, and that numerous U.S. reconnaissance aircraft were flying missions out to extreme range, based on how long they were airborne.  This information was also filed under, "gee, that's nice" by Japanese commanders.
    On the morning of 4 Jun, the Japanese carrier force executed a woefully inadequate search plan.  Like the U.S., the Japanese knew very well from pre-war exercises that whichever carrier force found the other one first had a decisive advantage.  Yet despite this, the Japanese much preferred not to "waste" carrier-based strike aircraft on reconnaissance, preferring to rely instead on long-range land-based aircraft and catapult-launched float-planes from battleships and cruisers.  Relying on land-based aircraft did have an operational security advantage, in that reconnaissance by land-based aircraft did not give away the presence of an aircraft carrier.  This, however, was not an option for the Japanese at Midway.  It was an option for the U.S., which is why RADM Fletcher kept his morning reconnaissance flight close to his carriers (within 100 miles) so as to not give away is presence, relying on the Midway-based PBY Catalina's to find the Japanese carriers.   Given the complexity of the Japanese plan, float-plane capable escort ships were spread thin.  Within the Japanese carrier force, the two battleships, Haruna and Kirishima, carried three float-planes (of limited range) and the two cruisers Tone and Chikuma had been built to carry five longer range float-planes.
   Just before daybreak on 4 June, the Japanese launched seven aircraft to conduct a search of about a 200 degree sector, which resulted in Swiss cheese coverage, particularly given the cloud conditions to the east northeast, which is where the U.S. carriers were.  VADM Chuichi Nagumo and his staff understood that the search plan was weak, but accepted it.  They still believed they had the element of surprise, and they were fixated on maximizing the first strike on Midway Island.  They also still believed that it was unlikely any U.S. ships would be in the area, and if there was a carrier, there wouldn't be more than one.  The Japanese believed that the Lexington (CV-2) had been torpedoed and sunk by a submarine in January (actually it was the Saratoga (CV-3), but only damaged.)  The also believed they had sunk both the Yorktown and the Saratoga (because they'd already "sunk" her sister Lexington) at Coral Sea. One carrier had been spotted near the Gilberts (either Enterprise (CV-6) or Hornet (CV-8)) and although the Japanese didn't know for sure where the Ranger (CV-4) and Wasp (CV-7) were, they had last been located in the Atlantic.  That left one U.S. carrier to oppose the Midway strike, and the Japanese remained convinced, based on no evidence, that that carrier was cowering in Pearl and would need to be drawn out to fight.  Their complacency, a symptom of "victory disease," (the sense of their own invincibility coupled with the fatigue of six months of non-stop operations) would prove fatal.
    Tone's No. 4 scout (an Aichi E13A Type 0 "Jake") launched late, due to reasons that still remain unclear, to fly the #4 search line.  Her late launch has been cited by many historians as a key factor in the Japanese defeat by not detecting the U.S. carriers until it was too late.  Actually, Chikuma's No. 1 scout, launched on time, and flying #5 search line, should have seen TF-17 at approximately 0615, but did not, due to clouds or other factors that remain unclear.  Even if Chikuma No. 1 had found the U.S. carriers at 0615, it was already too late for Nagumo to launch the reserve strike (107 aircraft , armed with anti-ship weapons) before the U.S. carriers started launching.  Nagumo lost the battle as soon as he launched the first strike on Midway Island (in accordance with Yamamoto's plan) without knowing the U.S. carriers were in the vicinity.  Had Chikuma No.1 sighted the U.S. carriers earlier, the best Nagumo could have done would have been to trade blows (a typical outcome of pre-war U.S. exercises.)  If Tone No. 4 had launched on time and flown the prescribed route, she would have missed the U.S. carriers, and the first indication Nagumo would have had of U.S. carriers was the 15 TBD's of USS Hornet's Torpedo Squadron 8.
    Rochefort's reward for his success was to be recalled to Washington by OP-20G on a pretext, never to return to Hypo, and to be given command of a floating drydock.  Nimitz' recommendation that Rochefort be awarded the Distinguished Service Medal was denied by CNO King on the recommendation of Rochefort's Washington chain-of-command, who then took credit for having broken the Japanese code and predicted the Midway operation, even though they had done no such thing.  Nimitz tried to get King to reconsider, but got side-tracked by having a world war to run.  Not until Intelligence records become declassified in the 1970's did the real story become known to the public.  And not until after a years-long campaign by RADM Donald "Mac" Showers, who had been an ensign in Station Hypo with Rochefort, was Rochefort awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal by President Ronald Reagan in 1985, posthumously. 
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Thanks to Kit
Sorta like your email without the pictures…
 
                         "THAT WAS US"


                 A little house with three bedrooms,
                 One bathroom and one car on the street
                 A mower that you had to push
                 To make the grass look neat.

                 In the kitchen on the wall
                 We only had one phone,
                 And no need for recording things,
                 Someone was always home.

                 We only had a living room
                 Where we would congregate,
                 Unless it was at mealtime
                 In the kitchen where we ate.

                 We had no need for family rooms
                 
Or extra rooms to dine.
                 When meeting as a family
                 Those two rooms would work out fine.

                 We only had one TV set
                 And channels maybe two,
                 But always there was one of them
                 With something worth the view

                 For snacks we had potato chips
                 That tasted like a chip.
                 And if you wanted flavor
                 There was Lipton's onion dip.

                 Store-bought snacks were rare because
                 My mother liked to cook
                 And nothing can compare to snacks
                 In Betty Crocker's book

                 Weekends were for family trips
                 Or staying home to play
                 We all did things together -
                 Even go to church to pray.

                 When we did our weekend trips
                 Depending on the weather,
                 No one stayed at home because
                 We liked to be together

                 Sometimes we would separate
                 To do things on our own,
                 But we knew where the others were
                 Without our own cell phone

                 Then there were the movies
                 With your favorite movie star,
                 And nothing can compare
                 To watching movies in your car

                 Then there were the picnics
                 at the peak of summer season,
                 Pack a lunch and find some trees
                 And never need a reason.

                 Get a baseball game together
                 With all the friends you know,
                 Have real action playing ball -
                 And no game video.

                 Remember when the doctor
                 Used to be the family friend,
                 And didn't need insurance
                 Or a lawyer to defend

                 The way that he took care of you
                 Or what he had to do,
                 Because he took an oath and strived
                 To do the best for you.

                 Remember going to the store
                 And shopping casually,
                 And when you went to pay for it
                 You used your own cash money?

                 Nothing that you had to swipe
                 Or punch in some amount,
                 And remember when the cashier person
                 Had to really count?

                 The milkman used to go
                 From door to door,
                 And it was just a few cents more
                 Than going to the store.

                 There was a time when mailed letters
                 Came right to your door,
                 Without a lot of junk mail ads
                 Sent out by every store .

                 The mailman knew each house by name
                 And knew where it was sent;
                 There were not loads of mail addressed
                 To "present occupant".

                 There was a time when just one glance
                 Was all that it would take,
                 And you would know the kind of car,
                 The model and the make.

                 They didn't look like turtles
                 Trying to squeeze out every mile;
                 They were streamlined, white walls, fins
                 And really had some style.

                 One time the music that you played
                 Whenever you would jive,
                 Was from a vinyl, big-holed record
                 Called a forty-five.

                 The record player had a post
                 To keep them all in line
                 And then the records would drop down
                 And play one at a time.

                 Oh sure, we had our problems then,
                 Just like we do today
                 And always we were striving,
                 To find a better way.

                 Oh, the simple life we lived
                 Still seems like so much fun,
                 How can you explain a game,
                 Just kick the can and run?

                 And why would boys put baseball cards
                 Between bicycle spokes....
                 And for a nickel, red machines
                 Had little bottled Cokes!

                 This life seemed so much easier
                 Slower in some ways
                 I love the new technology
                 But I sure do miss those days.

                 So time moves on and so do we,
                 And nothing stays the same.
                 But I sure love to reminisce
                 And walk down memory lane.

                 With all today's technology
                 We grant that it's a plus;
                 But it's fun to look way back and say
                 HEY GUYS, THAT WAS US!
 
This is great and brings back memories of growing up in the 40s and50s

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 Thanks to Chuck
This may be one of the "best videos ever" of the ocean with a 3D effect.   
The clarity is unbelievable.
Ocean In 3D   .
No special glasses or anything needed.
Only the people actually living it can, most likely, see it any  clearer.
This is in HD, 3D, I hope your  monitor can view it that  way.
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Thanks to Al
Monday Morning Humor--Yosemite National Park
     Patty and I went to Yosemite for our niece's wedding . Patty was concerned about camping because of bears and said she would feel more comfortable in the lodge. I said that I'd like to camp. To calm her concerns, I suggested we talk to the park ranger to see what the likelihood of a bear encounter would be.
     The ranger told us, "Well, we haven't seen any grizzlies in this area so far this year, or black bears, for that matter."
     Patty shrieked, "There are TWO types of bears out here? How can you tell the difference? Which one is more dangerous?"
     The ranger replied, "Well, that's easy -- see, if the bear chases you up a tree and it comes up after you, it's a BLACK bear. If it SHAKES the tree until you fall out, it's a grizzly."
     The room at the lodge was quite nice.
Below are questions that people "actually asked" of Park Rangers at Yosemite National Park...
·        Where are the cages for the animals?
·        What time do you turn on Yosemite Falls?
·        Can I get my picture taken with the carving of President Clinton?
     The new version of Apple's OS X is called "El Capitan" after the peak in Yosemite, which took 100 million years to create and is nearly impossible to scale.
     The park rangers were advising hikers in Yosemite to be alert for bears and take extra precautions to avoid an encounter.
     They advise park visitors to wear little bells on their clothes so they make noise when hiking. The bell noise allows bears to hear them coming from a distance and not be startled by a hiker accidentally sneaking up on them. This might cause a bear to charge.
     Visitors should also carry a pepper spray can just in case a bear is encountered. Spraying the pepper into the air will irritate the bear's sensitive nose and it will run away.
     It is also a good idea to keep an eye out for fresh bear scat so you have an idea if bears are in the area. People should be able to recognize the difference between black bear and grizzly bear scat.  Black bear droppings are smaller and often contain berries, leaves, and possibly bits of fur. Grizzly bear droppings tend to contain small bells and smell of pepper.
     I find it ironic that the Food Stamp Program, administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, is proud to be distributing this year the greatest amount of free meals and food stamps ever, to 46 million people.
     Yet while we were at Yosemite, the park rangers asked us "Please Do Not Feed the Animals. Their stated reason for the policy is because "The animals will grow dependent on handouts and will not learn to take care of themselves."
Which US national park is most welcoming to Hebrews?
Yosemite!
An actual one-star review of Yosemite on Yelp.com…
"Trees block views and too many grey rocks."
Have a great week,
Al
 


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