Monday, July 16, 2018

TheList 4765

The List 4765TGB


To All,
A bit more of history and some tidbits
Regards,
Skip
This day in Naval History
July 11
1798—President John Adams signs an act that reestablishes the Marine Corps under the Constitution. The following day, Maj. William W. Burrows is appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps.
1918—Henry Ford launches the first of the 100 intended Eagle boats. These boats have a solid cement bow, especially built for ramming and sinking submarines. Note: production is halted after (PE 60), though some of the boats continue to serve as training and transport vessels until 1947.
1943—Gunfire from U.S. cruisers and destroyers stop German and Italian tank attacks against Army beachhead at Gela, Sicily. Troop transport SS Robert Rowan is set afire by air attack and explodes. USS Orizaba (AP 24) rescues all hands of 421 troops, merchant marines and guards.
1944—USS Sealion (SS 315), in the Yellow Sea off the west coast of Korea, near Shosei Jima, sinks two Japanese freighters.
1987—USS Helena (SSN 725) is commissioned at Groton, CT. The Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarine is the fourth named for the capitol of Montana.
 
Thanks to CHINFO
Executive Summary:
Top national news includes the Justice Department giving the government more time to reunify migrant small children with their parents after missing its Tuesday deadline to do so, and continued coverage of President Trump's six-day European trip. USNI News reports that USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20) and USS Porter (DDG-78) are participating in the Sea Breeze 2018 exercise in the Black Sea. The exercise, which is co-hosted by the U.S. and Ukraine, involves 17 nations, 29 ships and 25 aircraft. Stars and Stripes reports that the Navy intends to promote NCOs who take "hard jobs in hard locations" as it looks to meet the demands of a growing fleet. "We're going to recognize talent, and we're going to put that recognition in the hands of commanding officers who are closest to that talent," said CNO Adm. John Richardson. Additionally, Stars and Stripes also reports that a Navy P-29A Poseidon located a lost fishing boat in the Indian Ocean on Tuesday after responding to a request from the Sri Lankan navy.
 
 
Today in History July 11
1302

An army of French knights, led by the Count of Artois, is routed by Flemish pikemen.
1346

Charles IV of Luxembourg is elected Holy Roman Emperor in Germany.
1533

Henry VIII is excommunicated from the Catholic Church by Pope Clement VII.
1708

The French are defeated at Oudenarde, Malplaquet, in the Netherlands by the Duke of Marlborough and Eugene of Savoy.
1786

Morocco agrees to stop attacking American ships in the Mediterranean for a payment of $10,000.
1799

An Anglo-Turkish armada bombards Napoleon Bonaparte's troops in Alexandria to no avail.
1804

1862

President Abraham Lincoln appoints General Henry Halleck as general-in-chief of the Federal army.
1942

In the RAF's longest bombing raid of World War II, 44 British Lancaster bombers attack the Polish port of Danzig.
1972

American forces break the 95-day siege at An Loc in Vietnam.
1975

Archaeologists unearth an army of 8,000 life-size clay figures created more than 2,000 years ago for the Emperor Qin Shi Huang.
1995

Full diplomatic relations are established between the United States and Vietnam.
 
1804
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This Week in American Military History
 
July 11, 1864:  Confederate Army forces under the command of Lt. Gen. Jubal Early reach the outskirts of Washington, D.C. Brief skirmishing follows. Artillery fire is exchanged. But a previous delay at nearby Monocacy Junction, Maryland, caused by a sizeable, but numerically inferior Union Army force under the command of Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace (future author of Ben Hur) buys time for Union defenders to strengthen their positions around the nation's capital. Early will withdraw the following day, commenting to one of his officers, "Major, we haven't taken Washington, but we scared Abe Lincoln like hell. The New York Times will refer to Early's drive toward D.C., "the boldest, and probably the most successful of all the rebel raids."
 
July 11, 1955: The first U.S. Air Force Academy class begins with 306 cadets at the Academy's temporary site, Lowry Air Force Base in Denver, Colorado. The Academy will be moved to its permanent site at Colorado Springs in 1958.
 
July 11, 1798: The U.S. Marine Corps – born as the Continental Marines Nov.
10, 1775 (the official birthday of the Corps) and disbanded at the conclusion of the American Revolution – is reestablished by an act of Congress.
 
July 12, 1862: The U.S. Army version of the Medal of Honor – the nation's highest award for valor in combat – is signed into law, stipulating that the decoration be awarded "to such noncommissioned officers and privates as shall most distinguish themselves by their gallantry in action, and other soldierlike qualities, during the present insurrection."
The Navy version (awarded to both sailors and Marines) had become law more than six months earlier, on Dec. 21, 1861.
 
July 14, 1813: Lt. (future Lt. Col.) John M. Gamble becomes the first – and thus far only – U.S. Marine to command a ship in action. Gamble's vessel, the captured British whaler Greenwich, captures the British whaler Seringapatam. Gamble – a Lieutenant (though several reputable sources say, captain) of Marines aboard USS Essex – had been awarded command of Greenwich by U.S. Navy Captain (future commodore) David Porter, who was the father of the Civil War's famous Admiral David Dixon Porter.Gamble's exploits will become legendary, though few know of him outside Marine Corps circles.
 
July 16, 1862: The U.S. Congress establishes the rank of rear admiral for David G. Farragut, who will become best known for purportedly uttering the command, "Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!," or the more likely command, "Damn the torpedoes! "Four bells. Captain [Percival] Drayton, go ahead! [Lt. Commander James] Jouett, full speed!" during the 1864 Battle of Mobile Bay, Alabama. Farragut (destined to become admiral) is the nation's first rear admiral
 
July 17, 1898: Spanish forces under the command of Gen. José Toral surrender Cuba to U.S. forces under Gen. William R. Shafter during the Spanish American War.
 
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Full article on the torpedoes….Don't they remember it was John Wayne that solved the torpedo problem. I remember the movie….
 
First this from Barrett
Our Torpedoes v Their Torpedoes:
 
I correspond with the webmaster of uboat.net, arguably the finest naval site online.  (Up there in Iceland "Gummi" doesn't seem to get out much!)  Years ago he mentioned that some Kriegsmarine ordies who designed faulty magnetic detonators went to prison.  I had to say that ours made flag.  The worst of the worst was FLEET ADMIRAL Wm. Leahy who became FDR's briefcase carrier (got the 5th star so the Brit field marshals would return his calls.)  He headed BuOrd during design of the notorious WW II torpedoes and apparently restricted testing, with well known results.
 
Leahy was opposed to the Manhattan Project: "As an ordnance expert I can say that the atom bomb will not work."  Later he took the um humanitarian approach that the bombs were unnecessary and chastised the Army Air Force for barbarity (you can read between the political lines where THAT is concerned!)
 
 
 
H-008-X
S.J. Cox
28 Jun 17
Torpedo versus Torpedo
     In 1940, a Japanese "walk-in" source provided the U.S. Naval Attache in Tokyo with information on the Japanese Type 93 "oxygen torpedo" (known after the war as "Long Lance.")  The Type 93 had much longer range, was faster, and had a larger warhead than any other known torpedo in the world.  The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) provided this intelligence, from an "impeccable source," to the Navy Bureau of Ordnance, which evaluated and dismissed the report in the belief that the Japanese could not have developed a torpedo more advanced than our own, and that the use of compressed oxygen as an oxidizer was too dangerous.  Seven U.S. Navy cruisers, nine destroyers, and the abandoned aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV-8,) and additional Allied ships were sunk by Type 93 torpedoes during World War II (over 3,100 U.S. Sailors killed,) in most cases when the target ships, believing themselves to be safely out of torpedo range, were hit by surprise.   The Type 93 and other Japanese torpedoes were reliable; U.S. torpedoes were not, despite being more "sophisticated."
U.S. Submarine Torpedo: Mark 14
    At the start of World War II, the newest operational U.S. torpedoes were the Mark 13 air-launched torpedo, the Mark 14 submarine-launched torpedo, and the Mark 15 surface-launched torpedo.  Although each torpedo was different, each version had significant components in common, particularly the Mark 6 magnetic influence exploder (on the Mark 14 and 15.)  As passive anti-torpedo defenses of capital ship designs significantly improved as a result of WWI experience, the U.S. sought to overcome increased armor, water-tight compartmentation, anti-torpedo blisters and other features by designing a torpedo that would pass underneath the target ship and detonate several feet below the keel using magnetic influence (similar to modern torpedoes.)   The Japanese approach to the same problem was to build a bigger, faster contact torpedo with a huge warhead. 
    U.S. submarine skippers were the first to realize that U.S. torpedoes had major problems, and they found out the hard way as a result of failed attacks.  The skipper of USS Sargo (SS-188) fired 12 torpedoes on 24 Dec 41 at four targets, the last four torpedoes with textbook perfect set up, and none hit.  USS Seadragon (SS-194) fired eight torpedoes on her first war patrol in Jan 42, for only one hit.  Numerous other submarine commanders experienced the same problem.  Even the great LCDR Dudley "Mush" Morton on Wahoo (SS-238) came back empty-handed from a patrol in May 1943, due to faulty torpedoes.  On 9 April 43, the skipper of USS Tunney (SS-282,) LCDR John A. Scott, had probably the most frustrating day in the history of the U.S. submarine force, with perfect short-range shots at three Japanese aircraft carriers (Junyo, Hiyo, and Taiyo,) firing all ten tubes without a single hit.
    The initial response from the Bureau of Ordnance(BuOrd) was to blame the submarine skippers ("operator error") because the torpedoes had worked fine in pre-war tests.  Actually, they hadn't.   Because of the expense of torpedoes (about $160K in today's dollars,) BuOrd's limited budget, and inability of the U.S. industrial base to produce anywhere near enough torpedoes required, the U.S. Navy conducted no tests before the war using production warshot torpedoes against an actual target.  (The Japanese conducted extensive live-fire tests against target ships.)  All U.S. tests used exercise warheads, with an upward looking camera substituting for the magnetic influence sensor, and since the exercise torpedoes passed under the target ships, as they were supposed to, the tests were deemed a success.
    The Mark 14 had several serious flaws, which masked each other.   The first flaw detected was that warshots ran about 10 feet deeper than set.  Shortly after assuming command of Southwest Pacific Submarines in Jun 42, RADM Charles Lockwood ordered a series of tests with submarines firing torpedoes into nets that conclusively proved that the torpedoes were running too deep.  By then Pacific Fleet submarines had fired over 800 torpedoes (a year's production worth, at that time) with very little to show for it.  When news of the tests reach CNO Ernest J. King, he turned his famous wrath on BuOrd, which however did not save a number of submarine skippers who had been relieved of command for supposedly being incompetent or not aggressive enough (in some cases true) but they certainly were not helped by torpedoes that didn't work.
    Once the Mk 14 depth control issue was recognized, many submarine skippers set their run depths to "zero," which increased the chance of a torpedo broaching, but even when the torpedoes ran at an appropriate depth, the number of premature detonations and duds greatly increased.  This is actually what happened to LCDR Scott on Tunney; seven of the ten torpedoes he fired at the three Japanese carriers would have been hits except that they exploded prematurely, resulting in only light damage to one carrier.  As submarine skippers began to suspect the Mark 6 exploder, nearly all requested permission to deactivate the exploder, which was denied.  As a result, some skippers deactivated the exploders anyway, and in their post-patrol reports inflated the estimated tonnage of their targets to justify expending more torpedoes per target.  RADM Lockwood, after he became Commander Submarine Force Pacific, used reports from submarine skippers as well as intercepted and decoded Japanese radio reports that documented premature explosions, to request permission from Admiral Nimitz to deactivate the magnetic exploders, which Nimitz promptly granted.  Deactivation was ordered on 24 Jun 43.
   The deactivation of the magnetic exploders solved the premature detonation problem, but revealed that the contact exploder had major design flaws as well, resulting in more duds.  LCDR Dan Daspit of USS Tinosa (SS-283) returned from a patrol with convincing data that the contact pistol was defective.  RADM Lockwood ordered another series of tests (drop tests and even firing torpedoes into cliff faces) that confirmed the detonators were defective.  In fact, torpedoes that hit the target at a 90 degree angle (i.e. a perfect shot) were more likely to fail.  The interim fix was for submarines to attempt to hit targets at more oblique angles, and this actually did help reduce the dud problem.
   The fourth major problem with the Mark 14 was a tendency to run in circles, with the risk to the submarine that fired the torpedo.  Although no U.S. subs are known to have been sunk by a circling Mark 14, this problem was never completely solved.  In fact USS Tang (SS-306,) LCDR Richard O'Kane commanding, was sunk on 25 Oct 44 by her own circling torpedo, a new Mark 18.  USS Tullibee (SS-284) was sunk by a circular run on 26 Mar 44, but the Mark of torpedo is unknown.
     By early 1944, with fixes finally implemented, the Mark 14 became a very reliable weapon that inflicted enormous damage to the Japanese Navy and merchant marine, but it could have inflicted so much more damage sooner had adequate budget resources been devoted to realistic testing and training before the war, and a more expeditious BuOrd shore establishment effort to fix problems identified by submarine skippers rather than trying to pass blame back to the sub skippers.
U.S. Air Launched Torpedo: Mark 13
    Like submariners, U.S. aviators quickly began to suspect that their torpedoes were frequently defective.  Dismal results with torpedoes during early carrier raids in the Marshalls and at Tulagi fueled suspicions.  Although some torpedoes actually hit the Japanese light carrier Shoho at the Battle of the Coral Sea, and worked as designed, there were actually significantly fewer hits than claimed, as many bomb near-misses were mistaken for torpedo hits.  No torpedoes hit the Japanese carrier Shokaku at Coral Sea, but none of the TBD Devastator torpedo-bombers were lost in that attack or during the attack on Shoho either, giving a false sense to U.S. commanders that the TBD/Mark 13 combination was a viable means of attack.  This notion was disabused at Midway when nearly every torpedo-bomber was shot down without obtaining a single hit.  Some reports claim that even before Midway, VADM Halsey had been so concerned about the TBD's lack of effectiveness and vulnerability that he had no intent to use them in future engagements until dive bombers had thoroughly worked over the targets well in advance.  Pre-war tactics ideally called for the dive bombers to drop on target just slightly ahead of the torpedo bombers in order to divert fighters and suppress anti-aircraft fire to give the torpedo bombers a better chance.  At Midway, the torpedo-bombers reached the Japanese carriers first, and paid the price.
      Due to high cost and production shortfalls, pre-war exercises with even exercise torpedoes were extremely rare, but even then showed that the Mark 13 was prone to running at errant angles, running on the surface or too deep, or not running at all, even when dropped at very low speeds.  In the case of air-dropped torpedoes, the reason for failure was generally because components of the torpedo were damaged upon impact with the water.  The U.S. Navy torpedo bomber at the beginning of WWII, the TBD-1 Devastator was not very fast to begin with, but additional speed and altitude restrictions meant to improve torpedo reliability made the TBD even more vulnerable to enemy fighters and shipboard anti-aircraft fire.  A sad irony is that extensive tests conducted after the Battle of Midway concluded that the stringent speed and altitude restrictions were actually counter-productive; the reliability of the torpedo had more to do with the angle it impacted the water than with speed or altitude of drop.  The slow speed and low altitude caused the torpedo to hit the water on a very flat trajectory that actually resulted in more component damage.
     Extensive tests in late 1942 and 1943 revealed twelve major flaws with the Mk 13 torpedo, which resulted in a dual track solution of making fixes to the Mk 13 while attempting to simultaneously accelerate the development, with significant technical risk, of the Mk 25 torpedo.  The development of shroud rings that reinforced the tail fins (frequently damaged in drops) and drag rings, which slowed the torpedo after drop (allowing the aircraft to maintain higher speeds and higher altitudes, while improving angle of entry into the water) had significant positive impact on Mk 13 reliability.  Although Mk 13 torpedo performance remained poor throughout 1943, by mid-1944 performance improved markedly, particularly with the addition of a radar to TBF Avenger torpedo-bombers that provided a precise range to the target.  By 1944, Avengers were able to drop the Mk 13 at altitudes up to 800 feet and 260 Kts, significantly increasing attack profile flexibility and aircraft survivability.
    Nevertheless, because of the torpedo bomber debacle at Midway (and the spectacular success of the dive bombers,) the U.S. Navy skewed carrier air group composition toward more dive bombers and fewer torpedo bombers after Midway.  The result was that fewer Japanese ships were sunk than might have otherwise been the case, which was a particular factor in the disappointing number of Japanese ship losses due to air attack at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in Jun 44.  Although Japanese aircraft carriers had design flaws that made them vulnerable to bombs, Japanese surface combatants were very resistant to bomb damage, and numerous Japanese surface combatants survived multiple bomb hits to fight another day.  Japanese battleships and heavy cruisers were almost impossible to sink with bombs alone, unless a bomb hit the torpedo banks on a cruiser.  The Japanese super-battleships Musashi and Yamato both absorbed numerous bomb hits and kept on coming; it was the improved Mk 13's that sank them (and even then, it took numerous torpedo hits.)
U.S. Surface-launched Torpedo:  Mark 15
    The Mark 15 torpedo was the standard torpedo employed by U.S. destroyers in WWII, and suffered most of the same problems as the Mark 14 submarine-launched torpedoes, except it took longer to detect the problems, because of fewer opportunities to employ the weapons in the early months of the war.  The Mark 15 was designed to have a longer range and larger warhead, which made it longer and heavier than the Mark 14.  Despite the differences, the Mark 15 and Mark 14 had numerous components in common, in particular the problematic Mark 6 exploder.   Problems with the Mark 15 were not actually solved until after the problems with the Mark 14 were first identified by the submarine community.
    U.S. Navy surface torpedo tactics were also seriously flawed, as they were developed in the 1930's without an appreciation for Japanese capabilities.  The U.S. Navy War Instructions (FTP 143) stated that U.S. cruisers were to avoid night fights unless conditions were favorable.  (U.S. cruisers had had their torpedo banks removed to save weight, whereas Japanese cruisers retained theirs.)  As a result, U.S. cruisers were unprepared for night fighting and suffered severely from Japanese torpedo attack during the Solomons campaign (which will become apparent in the next H-gram on Savo Island.)  Under FTP-143, U.S. destroyers were to attack first with guns, but to reserve torpedoes for capital ship targets.  The typical result was that Japanese ships (which held fire until after launching torpedoes) would fire their longer-range torpedoes at the U.S. gun flashes, and numerous U.S. destroyers were sunk before ever having a chance to employ torpedoes (despite the advantage of having radar.)  Not until the Battle of Vella Gulf in August 1943, after numerous battles in which U.S. destroyers suffered grievous losses, did U.S. Navy destroyers finally successfully execute a surprise night torpedo attack against a Japanese force.  Even at the night Battle of Surigao Strait in Oct 1944 (which was a debacle for the Japanese) the number of hits obtained by U.S. torpedoes relative to the number fired was dismally low.
Japanese Type 93 Sanso Gyorai "Oxygen Torpedo" (also known as "Long Lance")
    The term "Long Lance" was coined by U.S. Navy historian RADM Samuel Eliot Morison after World War II so was not used during the war.
   From the early 1920's, the Japanese understood that their Battle Line would always be outnumbered by the U.S. Battle Line, initially due to Washington and London Naval Treaty limitations, but also because senior Japanese naval leaders did have an understanding of, and respect for, U.S. industrial and ship-building capacity.  The Japanese expected a war with the United States to unfold in almost the same manner as the U.S. Navy did in War Plan Orange, specifically that the U.S. Battle Fleet would work its way across the Pacific to a climactic Mahanian duel of Battle Lines in waters near Japan.  Realizing their disadvantage, the Japanese embarked on an extensive effort to develop an asymmetric advantage (long before anyone came up with that term) to attrite the U.S. Fleet as it came across the Pacific so that the odds would be more even for the great surface battle.  The Japanese solution of choice was the night torpedo attack. 
   Throughout the pre-war years, the Japanese invested enormous resources in developing night torpedo attack capability, including extensive realistic nighttime training, despite the inherent danger.  By contrast, the U.S. severely curtailed realistic night training after the Point Honda disaster in Sep 1923, when seven destroyers ran aground at night at high speed doing exactly that kind of training (I will cover the Point Honda disaster in a future H-gram.)  The Japanese invested heavily in improved night optics, searchlights, pyro-technics, night scouting flights by cruiser-embarked float planes, and even lookouts specially selected for superior night vision.  Extensive live fire testing against actual target ships ensured torpedo reliability.
    The culmination of Japanese efforts was the development of the surface-launched Type 93 Oxygen Torpedo (and the similar, but smaller, Type 95 submarine launched torpedo.)  The Type 93 was a 24-inch diameter torpedo with a 1,080 Lb. warhead, that could range up to 22 NM at 35 Kts or 12 NM at 50 Kts, but would typically be employed between 6- 11 NM from the target (U.S. torpedoes were typically employed within 5 NM.)  Although U.S. torpedoes were technically more sophisticated with the highly secret Mark 6 exploder, the Japanese weapons were much more reliable, relying more on a brute force approach.  Nevertheless, the use of compressed oxygen as an oxidizer, which was the key to the Type 93's range and size, required the Japanese to successfully overcome numerous significant technological hurdles, which they did through extensive testing and lessons learned from a number of accidental explosions , and it took them from the early 1920's until 1935 to do it.  Both the British and the U.S. Navy had experimented with oxygen torpedoes (and the British Nelson-class battleships carried them in the early 1920's) their development had been essentially abandoned due to the inherent danger of the use of compressed oxygen.  Additional advantages of the Type 93 were that it could be fired from outside the range of U.S. searchlights, and the use of compressed oxygen resulted in very minimum bubble wake (caused by unburned nitrogen in other torpedoes.)  In many cases, U.S. ships were hit by Japanese torpedoes before they even knew the Japanese ships were there, sometimes believing that the torpedo had come from a submarine.
    Because the Type 93 torpedo was potentially as great a danger to its own ship as the enemy, the Japanese torpedomen were the elite sailors of the Japanese Navy and were very highly trained and extremely secretive.  The rest of the crew was generally completely unaware of what was really in the "secondary air tank" which stored oxygen for the torpedoes.  As the Japanese lost air superiority during the course of the war, ships facing imminent air attack had to decide whether to jettision their Type 93 torpedoes as a precaution.  At Midway, the Japanese heavy cruiser Mogami  jettisoned her Type 93's and survived a severe pounding, whereas Mikuma did not, and the explosion of her own Type 93's inflicted fatal damage.  At the Battle of Santa Cruz in Oct 42, the heavy cruiser Chikuma survived because she jettisoned her torpedoes, whereas at the Battle off Samar in Oct 1944, a desperation lucky 5-inch shot from the fleeing escort carrier USS White Plains (CVE-66) hit the heavy cruiser Chokai in the torpedo bank and she had to be scuttled.
    Despite the danger to themselves, the Japanese employed the Type 93 with devastating effect early in the war.  Allied Forces first encountered the weapon at the Battle of the Java Sea in February 1942, when a spread of Type 93's from the unseen heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi sank the Dutch light cruisers De Ruyter (taking the task force commander RADM Karel Doorman with her) and Java, and only through luck were the USS Houston (CA-30) and HMAS Perth spared, but only to be sunk by the same weapons from the Japanese heavy cruisers Mogami and Mikuma at the Battle of Sunda Strait the next night.  Type 93 torpedoes were primarily responsible for the loss of HMS Exeter in the Java Sea; USS Quincy (CA-39,) USS Vincennes (CA-44,) and USS Astoria (CA-34) at Savo Island; the USS Northhampton (CA-26)  at Tassafaronga; the USS Helena (CL-50) at Kula Gulf, and 11 allied and U.S. destroyers.  Despite the pre-war intelligence report, U.S. operating forces remained ignorant of the Type 93's true capability until examples were recovered intact following the Guadalcanal campaign in 1943, at great cost.
 
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Thanks to Robert…Better than summer reruns
Check out TVRAACA Old Car Movies
Lot's of great automotive related film/TV clips in this collection.  Check out the 1953 Corvette advertisement.  Enjoy !!  
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Item Number:1 Date: 07/11/2018 AFGHANISTAN - 12 DIE IN SUICIDE ATTACK ON SECURITY FORCES (JUL 11/INDEPUK)  THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.) -- At least 12 people have been killed in a suicide attack in eastern Afghanistan, reports the Independent (London).   On Tuesday, a militant on foot detonated his explosives near a security forces vehicle in Jalalabad in Nangarhar province, reported Agence France-Presse.   Two intelligence officers and 10 civilians were killed and five people were injured in the bombing, said a government spokesman. Most of the victims were children who were working at a car wash near the explosion site.   The attack targeted the intelligence service, said a provincial spokesman.   ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement on its Amaq news agency, reported Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.   The Taliban and a local IS affiliate have carried out numerous attacks in the Nangarhar province recently, including the July 1 suicide bombing that killed 19 people and injured 20 others.   Separately, Taliban militants attacked several police checkpoints in the Farah province on Monday night. Three security forces were killed and four were injured, provincial officials said
Item Number:2 Date: 07/11/2018 CANADA - NATO CBRN EXERCISE UNDERWAY IN ALBERTA (JUL 11/CDND)  CANADA DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE -- Defense Research and Development Canada (DRDC) is hosting an annual NATO chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense exercise in Alberta, reports the Canadian Dept. of National Defense.   The exercise began on Monday at Canadian Forces Base Suffield in Alberta and is scheduled to conclude on July 27.   Thirty-four Canadian soldiers from 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group based in Edmonton, Alberta, are participating in the training. The contingent will provide command-and-control capabilities and form two decontamination elements.   Specialists with knowledge, experience and skills needed to respond effectively to domestic and/or international CBRN-related events are also taking part, said a departmental release.   The training is designed to test the skills of participating nations and improve interoperability in a realistic environment.   Meanwhile, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced plans to keep troops stationed in Latvia until 2023 during a visit to that country on Tuesday, reported CBC News.   Trudeau also said that Canada would not meet NATO's target of 2 percent of GDP for defense spending by 2024. The latest NATO figures show that Canada spent 1.23 percent of GDP on defense. The government's defense policy document issued last year estimated that Canada would spend 1.4 percent of GDP on defense by 2024
  Item Number:7 Date: 07/11/2018 PAKISTAN - SUICIDE BOMBING KILLS TALIBAN OPPONENT, 19 OTHERS (JUL 11/GEONEWS)  GEO NEWS -- A candidate from an anti-Taliban party is among at least 20 people killed in a suicide bombing in northwestern Pakistan, reports Geo News (Karachi).   Haroon Bilour was killed during the attack on Tuesday, which targeted a meeting of the Awami National Party in Peshawar, the capital of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province.   At least 62 people were injured in the attack, said local authorities.   The Pakistani Taliban, also known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), claimed responsibility for the attack, reported CNN.   In a statement released on Wednesday, a TTP spokesman said that Bilour was targeted because of his party's "anti-Islam policies" and warned the public to stay away from ANP meetings.   Bilour's father, Bashir Bilour, an ANP leader, was killed by a suicide bomber in 2012.   The secular, primarily Pashtun ANP has been one of the TTP's main targets, noted Geo News.   Hours before the attack, a Pakistani military spokesman warned of security threats ahead national elections on July 25, reported Agence France-Presse.   More than 380,000 military personnel will be deployed to secure the elections, the military spokesman said
Item Number:10 Date: 07/11/2018 SOUTH SUDAN - U.N. REPORT ACCUSES GOVERNMENT TROOPS OF HUNDREDS OF KILLINGS IN 2018 (JUL 11/REU)  REUTERS -- South Sudanese government troops have killed at least 232 civilians and raped 120 women and girls in recent months, according to a U.N. investigation cited by Reuters.   The U.N. investigation singled out three commanders in the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) believed to carry the "greatest responsibility" for the violence, U.N. human rights chief Zeid Raad Hussein said in a statement on Tuesday.   The report does not name the individuals but lists their positions as: the Gany County commissioner (former Koch County Commissioner); one SPLA-IO (TD) commander (Lieutenant General) and former Major General of SPLA-IO (RM); and one SPLA commander (colonel) from the SPLA Division IV in Bentiu.   The report covers the period from April 16 to May 24 and is limited to 40 villages in Unity state, located in the country's north.   Among the crimes detailed in the report are incidents of slitting elderly villagers' throats, hanging a woman who resisted soldiers trying to loot her home and the execution of fleeing civilians.   The U.N. report suggests that these operations were part of a strategy to drive civilians from the area.   The SPLA has used proxies in its fight against opposition forces, including Justice Equality Movement (JEM), Mathiang Anyoor and various Nuer armed groups, according to the report.   Opposition forces loyal to former Vice-President Riek Machar also committed numerous atrocities, said the report
  Item Number:11 Date: 07/11/2018 SYRIA - ISIS-LINKED GROUP CLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY FOR DERAA SUICIDE BOMBING (JUL 11/NA)  NEW ARAB -- At least 14 people have been killed in a suicide bombing in southwestern Syria, reports the New Arab (London).   The attack occurred on Tuesday in the village of Zaizun, in western Daraa province.   It was claimed by the Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS) and was believed to have been carried out by Jaish Khaled bin Walid, an extremist opposition group that recently pledged allegiance to ISIS.   The details of the attack are disputed.   ISIS claims that a truck packed with explosives killed 35 Syrian and Russian troops loyal to the government in Damascus.   However, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a watchdog group based in the U.K., said that the attack killed 14 pro-Damascus troops and opposition fighters who had recently reconciled with the government.   Russian and Syrian government sources have not yet released official accounts of the attack. The pro-Damascus Al Masdar News reported that "scores" of Syrian soldiers were killed in the bombing.   One of the last opposition-held areas in Syria, Deraa has been largely peaceful since July 6, when Russia brokered a reconciliation deal that disarmed most of the opposition groups in the area.   Jaish Khaled bin Walid is one of the last groups to hold on in the province, with Russian war planes targeting their positions in Saham Al Golan in Deraa on Wednesday, reported Agence France-Presse
  Item Number:14 Date: 07/11/2018 USA - ARMY UNVEILS FUTURE COMBAT FITNESS TEST (JUL 11/MIL)  MILITARY.COM -- The U.S. Army says it is replacing its current physical fitness test, reports Military.com   The new six-event test is designed to be more challenging and better prepare soldiers for combat, the Army said on Monday.   The new events include strength deadlifts; standing power throws; hand-raised push-ups; 250-meter sprint; drag and carry; leg tucks; and a two-mile run. All events must be completed within 50 minutes, the Army said.   The announcement follows a six-year study, which concluded with the pilot Army Combat Readiness Test.   The test is about an 80 percent predicator of performance, compared to 40 percent for the existing test, said an Army release.   The new combat fitness test will be implemented by October 2020 for all soldiers, regardless of age or gender.  
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